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At the outset, l should note that I am very grateful to all contributors in 
this issue-Professors Kerry Abrams, Jacquelyn Bridgeman, Jennifer 
Chacon, Robin Lenhardt, and Laura Rosenbury for their insightful, 
powerful, and stirring reactions to my book According to Our Hearts: 
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Law of the Multiracial Family, 1 and to 
Professor Melissa Murray for her elegant Foreword to this issue. Reading 
the responses of these scholars whom I admire and respect has been 
exhilarating and affirming. Indeed, seeing the many ways in which just a 
small group of these reviewers have examined, interpreted, and even "felt" 
my scholarship has been invigorating. I also have found the insights from 
those reviewers whose visions reached beyond my intended goals for 
According to Our Hearts to be a positive signal of the book's ability to 
trigger additional debate as well as earn a special place within the literature 
* Charles M. and Marion J. Kierscht Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A., Grinnell College; 
J.D., University of Michigan Law School. angela-onwuachi@uiowa.edu. Thanks to Dean Gail 
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Multicul!ural Family (2013). I am particularly grateful to last year's Managing Editor, Amber 
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Fleck. Thanks, also, to the many individuals who helped me with According to Our Hearts, but 
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I. ANGELA 0NWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS: RHINELANDER V. 
RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY (forthcoming June 2013) (manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
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on family, history, society, and love. Ultimately, if According to Our Hearts 
causes any of its readers to think more deeply about issues of race, family, 
and intimacy-much like it did for the scholars noted above-then the book 
will have achieved a significant part of what I hoped for the project. 
In this Response Essay, I recount a few of the lessons that I learned 
from Professors Abrams, Bridgeman, Chacon, Lenhardt, and Rosenbury, as 
well as offer my responses to their critiques, observations, and praise of my 
book. In Part II of this Essay, I begin by addressing two contributors' 
critiques of the second part of According to Our Hearts by focusing on two 
factors that are central to understanding the project as a whole: (1) my 
primary goal in writing Part II of According to Our Hearts, and (2) my 
intended audience and strategies for reaching that audience. Specifically, in 
Part II of this Essay, I focus on Professor Chacon's Opening Our Hearts: A 
Response to Angela Onwuachi-Willig 's According to Our Hearts, and 
Professor Rosenbury's Marital Status and Privilege. In those essays, 
Professors Chacon and Rosenbury both question why I do not challenge 
marriage as an institution in According to Our Hearts and also raise 
questions about my proposal to add "interraciality" as a covered protected 
class in antidiscrimination statutes. Thereafter, in Part III of this Essay, I 
move on to discuss the remaining three authors' observations and analyses 
regarding various points in According to Our Hearts. In so doing, I highlight 
what these readers managed to teach me about my own project and its 
potential impact on how we imagine and reimagine ourselves and our 
families. In Part III, I primarily address the following essays: Professor 
Abrams's The End of Annulment, Professor Bridgeman's On Shifting Hearts 
and Minds: Interraciality, Equal Value, and Equality, and Professor 
Lenhardt's According to Our Hearts and Location: Toward a Structuralist 
Approach to the Study of Interracial Families. Specifically, I highlight 
important points that Professor Abrams makes about marriage as the 
ultimate form of self-expression, that Professor Bridgeman emphasizes 
about the intensity of our sense of fixed racial categories as well as the ways 
in which being a part of a multiracial family allows individuals to begin to 
challenge those rigid lines, and that Professor Lenhardt underscores about 
the need for more scholarship that explores the links between structural 
elements and what I refer to as the "placelessness" of multiracial families in 
According to Our Hearts. 
II. EXAMINING ALTERNATIVE VIEWS 
In their essays about According to Our Hearts, Professors Jennifer 
Chacon and Laura Rosenbury inquire whether I have gone far enough in 
challenging the normative ideal of family, and they raise a number of 
questions and concerns about Part II of the book. In Section A of this Part, I 
first address the specific inquiries that Professors Chacon and Rosenbury 
make about my decision to focus my book on families formed by intimate 
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couples. In Section B, I then address their feedback regarding my proposal at 
the end of Part II of According to Our Hearts to add the term "interraciality" 
to anti-discrimination statutes. 
A. Your View Ain't Like Mine-At Least with Respect to the Focus of 
According to Our Hearts2 
In exammmg According to Our Hearts, Professors Chacon and 
Rosenbury ask a number of important questions regarding marital status and 
privilege. First, Professor Rosenbury wonders why I do not "go beyond ... 
legal marriage itself' given its role in perpetuating the normative ideal of 
family. 3 She contends that I implicitly reinforce the marital ideal of family 
by primarily focusing on "the monoracial aspect of 'same-race couple 
privilege. "'4 Professor Rosenbury explains that legal marriage was 
"originally recognized ... in order to provide incentives for white men to 
privatize the dependency of white women and their children," and highlights 
how that "construct of marriage did not change" when the right of marriage 
was extended to Blacks. 5 Speaking again of the many privileges that come 
with marital status, she asserts, "[j]ust as one of the privileges of whiteness 
is not having to think about race, a privilege of marriage is not having to 
think of the ways that society is structured around marriage."6 Ultimately, on 
this point, Professor Rosenbury declares that "even as [I] embrace[] a 
nuanced conception of privilege, [I] similarly assume[] that privilege should 
2. This subtitle is a play off of the title of Bebe Moore Campbell's book, YOUR BLUES AIN'T 
LIKE MINE ( 1995). 
3. Laura A. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 769, 779 
(2013) [hereinafter Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege]. 
4. Id. at 780. 
5. Id. at 778-79. Throughout this Essay, I capitalize the words "Black" and "White" when I 
use them as nouns to describe a racialized group. I do not capitalize these terms when I use them as 
adjectives. Additionally, I find that "[i]t is more convenient to invoke the terminological 
differentiation between black and white than say, between African-American and Northern 
European-American, which would be necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two 
typologies." Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: A/lacking 
Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4. Pr9fessor Kimberli: Crenshaw, one of 
the founders of Critical Race Theory, has explained that "Black" deserves capitalization because 
"Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos, ... constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require 
denotation as a proper noun." Kimberli: Williams Crenshaw, Race. Reform. and Retrenchment: 
Transjormalion and legitimation in Antidiscrimination law, IOI HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 
(1988) (emphasis omitted). Also, I generally prefer to use the term "Blacks" to the term "African 
Americans" because the term "Blacks" is more inclusive. For example, while the term "Blacks" 
encompasses black permanent residents or other black non-citizens in the United States, the term 
"African Americans" includes only those who are formally United States citizens, either by birth or 
naturalization. 
6. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 784 (citation omitted). 
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flow to marriage; [she contends that I] would simply like more of the 
extralegal effects of that privilege to flow to black-white couples."7 
Like Professor Rosenbury, Professor Chacon contends that According 
to Our Hearts offers a "triumphalist account of the institution of marriage .. 
. . " 8 Although Professor Chacon acknowledges that my proposed legal 
solution was not developed "with indifference to the plight of the broad 
range of individuals who might suffer from such discrimination," she argues 
that my project is largely justified "as a means of protecting individuals in 
traditional nuclear family configurations."9 She worries whether my "focus 
on the multiracial family as a site worthy of protection might implicitly buy 
into notions of family that are themselves unnecessarily exclusive," and she 
points out that "[ s ]hoehoming caring relationships into familial categories 
that the state easily cognizes can have the effect of marginalizing 
relationships that do not conform to the norm." 10 She asserts that there are 
no "single parents, [no] adult siblings cohabiting and raising children from 
prior relationships, [no] grandparents as primary caregivers, [no] 
polyamorous groupings[, and no] single, childless individuals" amongst the 
subjects whom I surveyed. 11 Professor Chacon does not question whether 
my proposal would offer protection to those who fall outside of the 
traditional nuclear family; indeed, she asserts that it would. Instead, she asks 
whether the invisibility of non-nuclear families should have mattered to me 
more. 
All of Professors Chacon's and Rosenbury's points are excellent and 
bring up important concerns about the role that marriage plays in 
perpetuating unfair status hierarchies that label some families as ideal, others 
as closer to that ideal, and still others as deviant. In fact, I have raised very 
similar questions about state endorsement of marriage in my previous 
scholarship. For example, in my article The Return of the Ring: Welfare 
Reform 's Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, I challenged 
proposals for a marriage cure to poverty in welfare legislation and 
7. Id. at 783. 
8. Jennifer Chacon, Opening Our Hearts: A Response to Angela Onwuachi-Willig 's 
According to Our Hearts, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 725, 737-38 (2013) [hereinafter Chacon, 
Opening Our Hearts] (asserting that "this account also raises questions about how the privileging of 
certain familial structures can play a role in fostering other forms of discrimination"). 
9. Id. at 735. 
I 0. Id. at 729, 735. 
11. Id. at 736. Only couples, both opposite-sex and same-sex, were included in my survey and 
follow-up interviews. My analysis of cases, however, was slightly broader; ultimately, my case 
analyses were limited by the cases that are available to review, and nearly all of the interraciality 
cases involved only a plaintiff from a couple. Only one case that I found involved a different family 
formation, a single mother and her child, and I analyze that case in Chapter Eight of According to 
Our Hearts. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I. 
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emphasized the way in which marriage has served as a tool for "privatiz[ing] 
responsibility for individual economic stability within the families of newly-
emancipated Blacks so that states' economic responsibility to provide for 
former slaves would be minimized." 12 Furthermore, in Return of the Ring, I 
explicitly expressed my concerns about how states generally endorse 
marriage as the only acceptable form of family in contemporary society. 13 I 
asserted: 
The husband-wife dyad should not be the only household structure 
that states encourage and support in the effort to assist poor 
families with children to escape poverty. A child does not need 
exactly one mother and one father to raise him or her. If it is true 
that two parents are better equipped than one, then one must accept 
the probability that three are better than two. There is no principled 
reason why the law should require the foundation of family where 
the care of children is concerned to be an intimate relationship 
involving two people of the opposite sex. 14 
Generally, I agree with the arguments that Professors Chacon and 
Rosenbury have highlighted when those arguments are applied to broad 
examinations of family law and marriage; however, both scholars seem to 
have ambitions that reach far beyond the more discrete intervention that is 
being made in my book. My primary focus in Part II of According to Our 
Hearts was never to engage in a broad, overall exploration of family; the 
many hierarchies among different family forms; or marriage's role in 
perpetuating those hierarchies. Rather, my primary goal was to contest the 
perception that law no longer facilitates discrimination against interracial, 
heterosexual couples. Although I first began to write my book because of my 
attraction to the Rhinelander case itself (which is the focus of Part I of 
According to Our Hearts), I was moved to write Part II because I 
specifically wanted to focus on the narrow goal of contesting the too-
frequently-held and -asserted assumption that Loving v. Virginia and its 
progeny eliminated all negative, legal effects of racism for interracial, 
heterosexual couples. 
Indeed, throughout Part II of According to Our Hearts, I explicitly 
frame, identify, and remind readers of my limited goal of discrediting the 
myth of a discrimination-free life, as it relates to law, for interracial, 
heterosexual couples in a post-Loving v. Virginia era. For instance, in 
Chapter Six of According to Our Hearts, I explicitly state that my aim is to 
12. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Re.form's Marriage Cure as 
the Revival a/Post-Bel/um Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1653 (2005). 
13. Id. at 1688-94. 
14. Id. at 1689. 
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disprove the idea that our legal system adequately protects interracial, 
heterosexual couples and to expose how law facilitates unique forms of 
discrimination and microaggressions 15 against such couples and their 
families. I assert: 
Because antidiscrimination law generally excludes gay and lesbian 
individuals from protection from discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and because there is prevalent, open prejudice against 
same-sex couples in our society, the lack of legal protection and 
social acceptance for gay and lesbian couples and their families is 
widely exposed for all to see. However, it is not so easily exposed 
for interracial, heterosexual couples; my goal in this book is to 
make such lack of acceptance and protection under the law for 
multiracial families more visible for others to see and understand. 
In this second part of According to Our Hearts, I unpack the widely 
held assumptions about how law adequately protects interracial, 
heterosexual couples in a post-Loving v. Virginia era, showing, 
instead, how law and society function together to create both a 
legal and social placelessness for multiracial families and the 
individuals within them. 16 
Similarly, at the beginning of Chapter Seven of According to Our Hearts, I 
reiterate the focus of my argument in Part II of the book. I indicate: 
[B]ecause in this chapter, like the rest of this book, I wish to 
challenge the commonly accepted notion that legal discouragement 
of and punishment for intimate, cross-racial heterosexual intimacy 
no longer exists, I focus largely on individuals in interracial, 
heterosexual couples, and specifically black-white couples, as a 
means of unpacking and discrediting these legal myths. 17 
Naturally, I found that the most convincing way to discredit this myth 
about interracial, heterosexual couples was to focus my analyses on the very 
couples who are the subject of the myth. Indeed, when I started to write 
According to Our Hearts, I initially intended to include only interracial, 
heterosexual couples in my survey and interviews because, as I note several 
times in the book, 18 no one can deny that anti-discrimination laws do not 
15. DERALD WING SUE, MICROAGGRESSIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RACE, GENDER, AND 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 5 (2010) (defining microaggressions as "brief and commonplace, daily 
verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that 
communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial, gender, sexual-orientation, and religious slights 
and insults to the target person or group"). 
16. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 121-22 (emphasis added). 
17. Id. at 20 I ( emphasis added). 
18. See, e.g., id. at 121-22, 200-01. 
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adequately protect families consisting of and headed by same-sex couples, 
whether they are monoracial or interracial. It was not until later that I 
changed my mind and decided to also include interracial, same-sex 
couples. 19 Admittedly, this decision to include interracial, same-sex couples 
in my survey was influenced, in part, by my emotions-by my sense that it 
just did not feel right to exclude interracial, same-sex couples, couples with 
whom I, as a friend, had often discussed these issues and whom I knew had 
undergone comparable experiences. In this sense, I agree with Professor 
Chacon; my emotional reaction to the thought of excluding interracial, same-
sex couples is, in a way, a recognition that "[s]hoehoming caring 
relationships into familial categories that the state easily cognizes can have 
the effect of' writing out certain kinds of relationships. 20 However, my 
decision to include interracial, same-sex couples in my survey and 
interviews was not based solely on emotion, but also by my sense that the 
same arguments that I was making about the realities for interracial, 
heterosexual couples would, at some point, also apply (though not exactly in 
the same way) to same-sex couples. As I was writing According to Our 
Hearts, it became clear that the right to gay marriage was changing from one 
of pure exclusion to greater inclusion21 (not a high standard, given the extent 
of exclusion across the country). Against this backdrop, I reasoned that it 
was even more crucial for me to include interracial, same-sex couples in my 
survey and interviews because I could imagine a future in which the United 
States Supreme Court would strike down bans on same-sex marriage as 
unconstitutional and more so, could imagine a future in which people would 
make similar Loving-fixed-everything-in-the-law-type arguments after such 
a decision, despite what I knew would be a future contrasting reality of 
continued discrimination and microaggressions for families consisting of or 
centered around same-sex couples. 
Again, the goal of my project, and specifically Part II ( where Professors 
19. In fact, as I was writing According to Our Hearts, I had many casual conversations with 
people that confirmed this point. When people would ask me about my book, I would briefly 
describe the project to them. They were always encouraging, but they always focused in on the fact 
that I was interviewing same-sex couples and tended to zero in on the right to gay marriage. It was 
clear to me that most people saw the issue of multiracial families as a non-issue in law. To them, 
there was no problem, either legally or socially, for families consisting of or headed by interracial, 
heterosexual couples because of cases like loving v. Virginia. Of course, this reaction only made it 
clearer to me that I needed to deconstruct the myth of adequate legal protections for heterosexual, 
interracial couples. 
20. Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 735. 
21. Ben Brumfield, Voters Approve Same-Sex Marriage for the First Time, CNN.COM (Nov. 
7, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/l l/07/politics/pol-same-sex-marriage (noting that 
"Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire and New York - - and the District of 
Columbia" allow gay marriage and further stating that "[r]ecent national surveys have shown 
shifting attitudes toward same-sex marriage, with a majority of Americans now approving of 
marriages between two men or two women"). 
800 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] 
Chacon and Rosenbury focus their criticisms), was not to challenge the 
hierarchies among different family forms, or to challenge the institution of 
marriage itself. There is already a very rich and extensive legal literature on 
these very topics, including scholarship by Professor Rosenbury22 and other 
scholars such as Professors Martha Fineman, 23 Katherine Franke, 24 Melissa 
Murray, 25 Nancy Polikoff,26 and Alice Ristroph. 27 However, before I wrote 
According to Our Hearts, there was essentially no literature in law that 
focused on the arguments that I was making about the gaps in legal 
protections afforded to interracial, heterosexual couples in a post-Loving v. 
22. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 
EMORY L.J. 809, 811 (2010) ("arguing that sex should be decoupled in the legal sphere from both 
domestic relationships and other traditional forms of emotional intimacy" and challenging "the 
dominant, almost sacred, understanding that the most important relationships between adults should 
always be both sexual and emotionally intimate"); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 189, 191 (2007) [hereinafter Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?] (explaining "how 
family law's failure to recognize friendship impedes existing attempts to achieve gender equality 
through the elimination of state-supported gender role expectations" and contending that "family 
law's recognition of marriage and silence with respect to friendship maintains a divide between 
marriage and 'mere' friendship, implying that nonspousal friendship differs sufficiently from 
marriage and marriage-like relationships to be properly outside the concern of family law"). 
23. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 239, 
244-45 (2001) (citations omitted) ("The concept of marriage, and the assumptions it carries with it, 
limit development of family policy and distort our ideology. The availability of marriage precludes 
consideration of other solutions to social problems. As the various (and by no means exhaustive) 
meanings of marriage listed above indicate, marriage is expected to do a lot of work in our society. 
Children must be cared for and nurtured, dependency must be addressed, and individual happiness is 
of general concern. The first question we should be asking is whether the existence of a marriage is, 
in and of itself, essential to accomplishing any of the societal goals or objectives we assign to it."). 
24. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 104, 1399, 1414 (2004) (challenging the push for the right to gay marriage because 
such legal reforms have "created a path dependency that privileges privatized and domesticated 
rights and legal liabilities, while rendering less viable projects that advance nonnorrnative notions of 
kinship, intimacy, and sexuality"). 
25. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of 
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 439-40 (2008) ("[T]he reform project that has been 
underway in family law has been the effort to reconcile heterosexual marriage as the normative 
model for adult intimate relationships with the reality of a diversity of adult intimate relationships. 
Reforms in this area have cleaved to three basic approaches."); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, 
Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1240 (2010) ("Legislators and other policymakers 
are free to regulate families qua families, and to encourage or discourage certain kinds of familial 
relationships. Legal privileges or burdens are often contingent on an individual's family status. One 
of the most obvious ways in which states-and the federal government-have established a 
particular vision of the family is by limiting civil marriage to heterosexual couples."). 
26. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and 
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. 
L. REV. 1535, 1546 (1993) (highlighting that privileging marriage over other types of intimate 
relationships can reinforce gendered roles and assumptions that are associated with marriage). 
27. See, e.g., Ristroph & Murray, supra note 25, at 1240. 
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Virginia era. 28 To my mind, it made no sense for me to spend time 
replicating part of the excellent work that other scholars had already 
produced and were continuing to conduct on issues of marriage and the 
hierarchies among different family relations when I could offer completely 
new insights on a topic that I viewed as vastly underexplored. 29 
In fact, no part of Professor Chacon and Rosenbury's critiques 
illustrates the distinction between my project and their proposed project 
more than two particular segments of Professor Rosenbury's essay Marital 
Status and Privilege. In the first segment, Professor Rosenbury asserts the 
following: 
Unpacking the knapsack of unearned marital privilege, and 
spreading its goods across a broader range of relationships, 
therefore appears to be the best strategy for loosening, if not 
releasing, the ideal of family. In a world that recognized more 
diverse forms of relationship, place-based racial hierarchies and 
other forms of white privilege would still disadvantage black 
couples and black-white couples. But legal marriage would no 
longer clearly privilege some and stigmatize others, cracking the 
foundation of extralegal forces that maintain hierarchies of 
1 · h" 30 re at10ns 1p. 
Through this quoted language, Professor Rosenbury sets forth arguments 
that detail why I should have challenged marriage as "the norm against 
which all relationships are measured."31 At the same time, however, 
Professor Rosenbury seems to give in to the idea that race-based hierarchies 
cannot be dismantled. In this sense, she surrenders my specific project, 
which is about race and disrupting, challenging, and eliminating a particular 
kind of racial hierarchy among families, in favor of what she views as the 
larger or more crucial project of breaking up the mold of "extralegal forces 
that maintain hierarchies of relationship," even though, as she notes, "black 
couples and black-white couples" will still be disadvantaged. 32 Yet, if one 
28. I had previously co-authored such work with my husband. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig 
& Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided: The Invisibility of the Multiracial Family, 44 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231 (2009). 
29. Moreover, given the limited number of pages that I had for writing According to Our 
Hearts, it became clear early on that I could not also convey broad-based arguments about marriage 
and family in the book. In fact, in the middle of my book drafting, I had to accept that I would have 
to delay my plans for including a close examination of children in multiracial families in According 
to Our Hearts and reserve it for another book project. For similar reasons, I, in part, made the 
decision at the outset of the book project to look only at black-white couples and their families. 
30. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 785-86 (citation omitted). 
31. Id. at 785. 
32. Id. at 786. My comment here is not intended at all to question Professor Rosenbury's 
commitment to an antiracist stance, as I know that her commitment is strong. 
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concedes defeat by accepting the permanence of racial and interracial 
hierarchy among "couples" and family units and takes that issue out of 
According to Our Hearts, one has effectively cut out the core of my project. 
After all, According to Our Hearts covers the "law of the multiracial 
family," and its whole point is to challenge racial hierarchies among 
families, and specifically those that place multiracial families on the margins 
or leave them suspended in placelessness. 33 
In a second segment, Professor Rosenbury illustrates, again, an 
important distinction between the project that she and Professor Chacon 
suggest and my project in According to Our Hearts. In her essay, Professor 
Rosenbury makes the following point: 
Onwuachi-Willig targets privilege that monoracial couples no 
doubt enjoy and black-white couples often do not. Yet in 
describing that privilege, she posits a world in which couples are 
first, either "intimate partners" or "just friends," and, later, are 
either "intimate partners," "just friends," or "strangers." In doing 
so, Onwuachi-Willig embraces a hierarchy of relationships: 
privilege attaches to the understanding that couples are "intimate 
partners," and harm or discrimination flows from the mistaken 
perception that they are "just friends." In fact, "just friends" may 
be just like "strangers," given the modification of Onwuachi-
Willig's description. 
Onwuachi-Willig therefore implicitly embraces states' 
privileging of legal marriage over other relationships between 
adults, including friendship. After all, states recognize marriage 
and only marriage-friends are generally grouped with strangers 
for purposes of family law. More explicitly, like the majority 
33. Id. at 785-86. This segment of Professor Rosenbury's paper also highlights the stark 
differences between the way that she and I view this issue of hierarchy. For example, Professor 
Rosenbury attributes the fact that I "lament[] that 'true intimacy' or 'true relationships' between 
African Americans and whites often did not result in marriage in the pre-Civil Rights era," to a 
personal view of "marriage as an effective relationship." Id. at 777 n.52. However, while I do value 
marriage as an institution more than most progressive family law scholars, my bemoaning of these 
particular couples' inability to marry was not a statement about marriage or its effectiveness as a 
relationship, but instead one about exclusion based on race. I, like many sociologists and like legal 
scholars such as Professor Randall Kennedy, believe that interracial marriage rates-and, 
historically, the racial groups that were covered by anti-miscegenation laws-provide us with crucial 
information about the status of different racial groups and thus different racial make-ups of families 
within our society. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, How Are We Doing With Loving?: Race, law, and 
Intermarriage, 77 B.U. L. REV. 815, 818-20 (1997) (stating that "African Americans are 
substantially less likely to marry whites than are Hispanics, Asians, or native Americans[,]" that the 
fact "[t]hat blacks intermarry with whites at strikingly lower rates than others is yet another sign of 
the uniquely encumbered and peculiarly isolated status of African Americans[,]" and that such facts 
are "an impediment to the development of attitudes and connections that will be necessary to 
improve the position of black Americans and, beyond that, to address the racial divisions that 
continue to hobble our nation"). 
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opm10n in Lawrence v. Texas, Onwuachi-Willig promotes "one 
vision of intimacy-that of a couple engaged in emotional and 
sexual intimacy." She therefore reinforces the common distinction 
between individuals who are viewed as dating and those who are 
"just friends," a "distinction [that] implies that [the] dating 
relationship may lead to the privileged state of marriage, whereas 
the friendship will not."34 
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As Professor Rosenbury correctly notes, I do make a distinction in my book 
between family relationships and friendships. In fact, in the endnotes of 
According to Our Hearts, I define the phrase "because of interraciality" as 
follows: 
My use of the phrase 'because ofinterraciality' concerns more than 
just mistreatment based on one's involvement in an intimate, 
interracial relationship-marriage or a committed, non-marital 
relationship. Generally speaking, the phrase encompasses 
mistreatment based on one's being part of an interracial family 
unit, which includes sibling relationships and parent-child 
relationships. It does not extend to mistreatment based on platonic 
friendships, however. 35 
While Professor Rosenbury has written compelling articles about the way in 
which marital and other intimate relationships may be unjustly privileged 
over friendships, such as in state intestacy rules, 36 that argument, at least to 
my mind, does not directly touch upon the specific arguments that I am 
setting forth in According to Our Hearts about the law's continued role, 
along with social norms, in facilitating discrimination against those in 
multiracial families. Indeed, being part of a collective that is generally 
recognized as part of a family unit is central to many of the examples that I 
highlight in my book, such as my analysis of gaps in employment 
discrimination law that do not allow for the recognition of the harms of an 
"invisible" couple requirement for certain jobs in Chapter Seven of 
According to Our Hearts. 37 
Furthermore, Professor Rosenbury's point about the hierarchy of 
relationships that places friends and strangers at the bottom of the ladder 
34. Rosenbury. Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 783-84 (citations omitted). 
35. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 284 n.54, 300 n.4, 305 n. I. 
36. Rosenbury, Friends with Benl?/itsr, supra note 22, at 216-19. In fact, in this segment, 
Professor Rosenbury highlights a point on which she and I may very well disagree. Like many 
family law scholars, I do not necessarily believe that benefits should be accorded on the basis of 
relationship, but if relationships remain the basis for distributing benefits, then I am not convinced, 
though one day I may be, that friendships should be at the same level as marital relationships, sibling 
relationships, and parent-child relationships, for example. 
37. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 212-32. 
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runs contrary to a specific point that I make about the place of friends versus 
family members within the relationship hierarchies in antidiscrimination law 
doctrine. As I note in Chapter Eight of According to Our Hearts, in such 
contexts, interracial relationships among friends are generally privileged 
over interracial relationships among family members, and particularly over 
those between interracial partners, which I contend are implicitly 
discouraged by the law. Here, I argue, the law works to encourage interracial 
friendships or working relationships, and it even provides a remedy for the 
loss of such connections, but it fails to do the same in certain contexts that 
involve interracial spouses and partners. As I explain in Chapter Eight, 
courts, due to law and society's limited and rigid understanding of racial 
categories, fail to acknowledge how the racial identity of individuals in 
multiracial family units may actually change based on their family 
experiences (such as when a white woman who is married to a black man, 
much like Professor Heather Dalmage, begins to view herself as a "non-
white, white person"). 38 Thus, courts neglect to see these individuals as 
having standing to pursue certain harassment claims. Specifically, I explain: 
In particular, current antidiscrimination law does not allow for a 
claim alleging direct, discriminatory harm to a plaintiff where the 
racial group targeted by the offensive and discriminatory 
comments is not the racial group to which the plaintiff-employee 
belongs, but rather the racial group to which the employee's spouse 
or partner belongs. In these cases, courts' understanding of how 
people-in particular, whites in interracial relationships-define 
themselves racially is too narrow. Under Title VII, a "plaintiff may 
assert only his own right to be free from discrimination that has an 
effect upon him and may not assert the rights of others to be free 
from discrimination." Courts have read this legal rule very 
narrowly, and as a result, plaintiffs who allege direct harm based 
upon being subjected to and negatively affected by comments 
regarding the racial group to which their spouse belongs are held to 
have no standing to sue. Only members of the racial group to 
which the comments and actions are targeted, whether or not they 
individually are the direct target of the conduct, can bring a viable 
claim on this basis. In others words, under current case analysis, a 
black plaintiff has standing to pursue a lawsuit for harm suffered as 
a result of witnessing and hearing derogatory racial comments 
against blacks other than herself. Such conduct is viewed, and 
rightfully so, as having the ability to directly affect and harm that 
plaintiffs environment even where she is not identified as the 
target. But a plaintiff who is not part of the racial group, even if she 
38. Id. at 256-64. 
A Room with Many Views 
is married to a person of that racial group, is seen as asserting harm 
only to a third party. In other words, unless the plaintiff describes 
her harm from the harassment as her being deprived of a diverse 
work environment-meaning racial minority co-workers in the 
workplace-because of the harassment, she has no claim. This lim-
ited framing for a claim, however, anticipates only temporary 
connections and effects from cross-racial, work interactions, 
rather than the long-term or lifelong connections and impacts that 
occur within families. In other words, the invisible assumptions 
about whom we may be connected to or should be connected to in 
friendships as opposed to familial or intimate relationships works 
to further reinforce the normative ideal of family as monoracial. 39 
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In other words, for various arguments that I make in According to Our 
Hearts, the distinctions between friendships and intimate interracial 
relationships matters, and they matter specifically because of the different 
ways in which interracial friendships get privileged over intimate, interracial 
relationships in certain antidiscrimination law contexts. In these contexts, 
unlike the situations that Professor Rosenbury focuses on in her scholarship 
such as intestacy matters, it is not the marital relationship that gets privileged 
over the friendship, but rather, it is the opposite. 
Finally, while Professor Rosenbury's contention that I "would simply 
like more of the extralegal effects of that privilege to flow to black-white 
couples"40 is correct, I do not see such desire as a problem in this instance. 
To my mind, there is nothing wrong with making an argument for equality 
for a particular group. My desire for black-white couples to enjoy more of 
the benefits that monoracial white couples enjoy does not mean that I do not 
want all families to enjoy these same benefits. Indeed, I may write an article 
that contends that black women should enjoy the same rights and privileges 
that white women enjoy in one area (as I have done in the past), 41 but my 
decision to make an argument about black women does not mean that I do 
not want Asian-American women or Latinas to enjoy those same rights and 
privileges. Rather, it just means that I made a decision to focus my 
arguments on black women (with the recognition that different groups get 
racialized and gendered in distinct ways). 42 The same reasoning applies to 
39. Id. at 257-58 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
40. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 783. 
41. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of' 
Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. I 079 (2010) [hereinatler Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair 
Piece] (criticizing courts for misapplying their own standards for evaluating "hair discrimination" to 
hair grooming policies that prohibit natural hairstyles for black women, such as braids, locks, and 
twists). 
42. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
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According to Our Hearts; I made a decision to focus on discrediting a 
particular myth, one that had not yet been explored and that I believed to be 
an important one that deserved special attention. The mere fact that I chose 
to focus on advocating for the increased rights or acceptance of one group 
does not mean I have abandoned my commitment to others. 
Further, I believe that Professors Chacon and Rosenbury's questions 
regarding the institution of marriage pay little heed to the audience factor. 
After all, one's audience always influences how she frames and states her 
arguments. With According to Our Hearts, I, like many first-time book 
authors, wrote the book with starry-eyed dreams of publishing a manuscript 
that would be accessible to many people, and in particular, accessible to 
significant numbers of non-lawyers. In fact, I worked hard to create a book 
that I believed could appeal to the everyday person outside of academia. To 
my mind, if I used According to Our Hearts to challenge the very institution 
of marriage, an institution, which as Professor Rosen bury indicates, "[ f]ew 
[ would] question whether states should privilege ... at all,"43 I would tum 
most readers away from my primary argument of discrediting a harmful 
myth about the lives of interracial, heterosexual couples. They would not 
even begin to consider my primary argument because they would be so 
focused on, and most likely angered by, the rejection of marriage as an 
institution. 44 
Although According to Our Hearts does not address the broader 
concerns that Professors Chacon and Rosenbury raise, I believe that the 
book succeeds in meeting the goals I set for it (and Professors Chacon and 
Rosenbury seem to agree). For instance, Professor Rosenbury specifies that 
According to Our Hearts 
illustrates the ways law perpetuates housing segregation, 
discouraging the formation of interracial relationships and often 
limiting the areas in which interracial spouses feel comfortable 
living. [Professor Rosenbury further explains that i]n even more 
detail, ... [the book] analyzes how some courts have adopted 
narrow interpretations of employment discrimination laws, failing 
to provide redress for employees facing harassment or adverse 
employment actions because of their interracial relationships. Such 
INTRODUCTION 9 (2012). 
43. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 782. 
44. In fact, many of the law professors who stand as the harshest critics of marriage as an 
institution are in fact married themselves. I certainly understand the many practical reasons why 
even these critics may still choose to get married, but if the revolution against marriage as an 
institution does not begin with these critics, despite their strong views, it hardly seems wise, even if I 
were willing to make broader arguments than the ones necessary for my primary aim in According to 
Our Hearts, to make such challenges to marriage to a lay audience that is certain to hold marriage in 
high esteem. 
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interpretations render invisible the ways employers may privilege 
employees in monoracial marriages to the detriment of employees 
in interracial marriages. 45 
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Professor Chacon adds to this claim, asserting I "establish[] that individuals 
in interracial marriages, or with children of racial backgrounds distinct from 
their own, are still subjected to everyday microaggressions and more 
egregious acts of discrimination."46 
In sum, while the project that Professors Chacon and Rosenbury hoped 
that I would pursue in According to Our Hearts is meaningful and definitely 
worth exploration, and is, in fact the topic of articles and essays by other 
scholars, including the excellent work of Professor Rosenbury, 47 it is not my 
project. According to Our Hearts contains a narrower focus, one that has not 
been pursued and is currently not being pursued by any other legal scholars, 
and one that speaks to a broad, rather than a purely academic, audience. In 
the end, I am grateful to Professors Chacon and Rosenbury for raising these 
inquiries so adeptly and compellingly, such that the three of us could have 
this conversation in this colloquium and, more so, so that any person who 
reads According to Our Hearts, along with these essays, may also begin to 
have similar conversations. 
B. Your Views Are Like Mine; However, I Am Not That Hopeful 
In addition to wanting me to challenge the institution of marriage in 
According to Our Hearts, Professors Chacon and Rosenbury also question 
my proposal to incorporate a new category called "interraciality" into anti-
discrimination statutes. Nevertheless, both Professors Chacon and 
Rosenbury pinpoint two items in my analyses of workplace discrimination 
based on interraciality as significant. For instance, Professor Rosenbury 
asserts that my consideration of ways that "monoracial marital privilege 
extends beyond the social sphere to the workplace. . . . is an important 
contribution, as scholars often assume that work is immune from the 
dynamics of intimacy pervading the private sphere."48 Additionally, 
Professor Chacon notes that "the most hopeful parts of[my] book [are] those 
in which [I] document[] the ways in which being part of an interracial 
collective actually transformed how certain members of the unit understood 
their own racial identities."49 
45. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 778 (citations omitted). 
46. Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 735 (citation omitted). 
4 7. See supra note 22. 
48. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 786 (citations omitted). 
49. Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 738. 
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However, both Professors Chacon and Rosenbury express concerns 
about my proposal to add "interraciality" as a covered category in anti-
discrimination statutes. Professor Rosenbury contends that such an addition 
would keep "those living outside the married couple form ... stigmatized" 
and "would likely reinforce monoracial privilege" because it would exclude 
interraciality from the definition of "race" and thus reinforce the sense that 
monoraciality, and not interraciality, is normative. 50 Professor Rosenbury 
further contends that the proposed category of "interraciality" would limit 
understandings of the performative nature of race, "further solidifying rather 
than destabilizing notions of race." 51 In the end, Professor Rosenbury argues 
that I should further embrace "the relational nature of race, racial privilege, 
and racial discrimination" and "support[] a more robust conception of the 
existing category of 'race,"' as "[t]he analysis in According to Our Hearts 
provides the most compelling account to date of the ways in which the 
choice of one's intimate partner influences understandings of race in the 
workplace, as well as throughout society, and the benefits and harms that 
flow therefrom."52 
Like Professor Rosenbury, Professor Chacon questions my proposal for 
an additional category of "interraciality." She offers three reasons to explain 
why an "interraciality" category would not be advisable: (1) "the addition of 
this category could be seen as a reason to abandon efforts to expand the legal 
understanding of what constitutes discrimination based on race"; (2) courts 
will likely read interraciality too narrowly; and (3) it would require 
"Congress to reopen discussion of the antidiscrimination provisions if they 
want to add a category" and "[g]iven political retrenchment on equality 
issues in recent years, it seems just as likely that the result would be a 
congressional narrowing of antidiscrimination law once the topic was 
opened for discussion."53 
In making these arguments, Professor Chacon notes her recognition of 
my internal struggle in offering a proposal for an additional category of 
"interraciality."54 After acknowledging my various articles that examine race 
as a factor that is determined by both physical and performative factors 55 
50. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 787-88. 
51. Id. at 788. 
52. Id. at 788-90. 
53. Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 730-31, 734. 
54. Id. at 732 ("A robust understanding of racial discrimination in antidiscrimination law 
would protect these aspects of personhood, but a crabbed understanding of discrimination does not 
do so. Professor Onwuachi-Willig knows this. which is probably why she does not have much faith 
that couns will apply an expansive version of antidiscrimination protections .... " (emphasis 
added)). 
55. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 
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and that "criticize[] the failure of antidiscrimination laws to offer protection 
for individuals who fail to perform their identities in ways that conform to 
majoritarian preferences,"56 Professor Chacon warns that my "additive 
approach-designed to deal with the realities of the jurisprudence--could 
have the undesirable effect of reifying the logic that undergirds a narrower 
understanding of what constitutes discrimination on the basis of race. "57 She 
asks: "[S]hould we add new categories, or work on reimagining the existing 
categories?"58 She concludes that we should not add a box for an interracial 
category because doing so just runs "the risk of hardening the lines against 
those whose claims do not fit neatly in any ofthem."59 
I agree with all of the substantive arguments that Professors Chacon and 
Rosenbury make about my proposal for an additional category of 
"interraciality" in antidiscrimination statutes. In fact, as Professor Chacon 
notes in her essay, "no one writes about or understands these limits better 
than" I do. 60 Indeed, in According to Our Hearts, I make it clear that I 
believe that "interraciality" easily fits within the category of "race."61 
Specifically, I write: "Although one could argue (to my mind, convincingly 
and easily) that the phrase because of such individual's race already 
Regarded as Black and Why Title Vil Should Apply Even i{Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. 
L. REV. 1283, 1295-1334 (contending that courts understand race too narrowly, focusing on skin 
color as a proxy for race, and ignoring other factors and proxies used to identify race such as name 
or voice); Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece, supra note 41, 1093-1124 (making a strategic, 
biological, and intersectional argument to explain why dress codes that prohibit natural hairstyles for 
black women, such as braids, locks, and twists, discriminate on the basis of race and sex, but noting 
how hairstyles are viewed as signaling something about black women's racial palatability); Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1907-1914 (2007). See 
also D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What's Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got To Do 
with It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1360-94 (2008) (arguing for greater judicial appreciation of the 
ways that appearance-related regulations are part of how race gets defined and how they operate as a 
form of racial discrimination); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: 
Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1172-94 (2004) 
(analyzing how employers use appearance and grooming standards to identify which racial identity 
performances are acceptable in the workplace and arguing that such efforts constitute intentional 
discrimination under Title VII); Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy: 
The Case olProposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 
1247-75 (2000) (analyzing the use of language and immigration status as proxies for identifying and 
then discriminating against Latinos); c{ Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 
DUKE L.J. 1487, 1551-55 (2000) (noting that existing antidiscrimination laws fail to protect from 
discrimination on the basis of skin color or skin tone, e.g., a light-skinned Black versus a dark-
skinned Black). 
56. Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 731. 
57. Id. at 732. 
58. Id. at 733. 
59. Id. at 734. 
60. Id. Of course, I can identify a number of scholars who write and understand these issues 
better than I do, but I am running with the language here. 
61. 0NWUACH!-WILLIG, supra note I, at 264. 
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encompasses a broad range of harms, including those based on interraciality, 
there are many practical and policy reasons for adding interraciality to the 
text of antidiscrimination statutes."62 In essence, I agree with Professors 
Chacon and Rosenbury that race is not just defined by the physical, but also 
by performance; that courts have defined race too narrowly in case law; and 
that the category of race already subsumes interraciality. In fact, Professor 
Chacon correctly interprets the basis for my decision to propose an 
additional "interraciality" category when she expresses her belief that I made 
my proposal because I do not "have much faith that courts will apply an 
expansive version of antidiscrimination protections" that include "(a] robust 
understanding of [race and] racial discrimination .... "63 
What Professors Chacon and Rosenbury and I disagree about is not 
substance, but rather strategy. For me, the question is not merely whether 
interraciality fits within the already existing category of race. The question is 
what plan or strategy is best for either taking us or getting us closer to the 
point where courts and citizens understand this very idea. In essence, while 
writing According to Our Hearts, I asked myself, "In a situation where I am 
wary about whether the war can ever be won, am I willing to embrace and 
accept the mere act of winning a battle?" In making my proposal at the end 
of According to Our Hearts, I answered "yes"-though I did not arrive at 
that answer without hesitation. Although I, like Professor Chacon, am weary 
about many people's narrow understandings of the concept of (and reality 
of) race,64 I am not certain that the best strategy is to hold out, in an all-or-
nothing fashion, for these same people to gain a true understanding of race 
and racism. Sadly, as someone who teaches and speaks about race and race 
discrimination, often to those who are trying very hard to understand race 
discrimination and the ways in which race is socially constructed, I must 
admit that I am not too hopeful about our reaching a point when the 
overwhelming majority of citizens, particularly Whites, will truly understand 
all of the complexities of race and racism. As Peggy Mcintosh explained in 
her article White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, it is 
particularly hard for Whites to understand race and the complex nature of 
racism because Whites are generally "oblivious" to all of the many 
privileges, both small and large, that come with their racial status. 65 Whites, 
62. Id. 
63. Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 732. 
64. Id. at 730 ("Past experience suggests that this hope is not necessarily misplaced."); see 
also id. at 733-34 ("The pragmatist would see that litigants challenging discrimination have not 
always had much luck convincing courts to apply antidiscrimination statutes expansively. The 
pragmatist might therefore seek to add a new category to address a specific social harm that is not 
always covered by antidiscrimination laws. That is the approach that Professor Onwuachi-Willig 
takes, and she can hardly be faulted for that .... "). 
65. PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE: UNPACKING THE INVISIBLE KNAPSACK (1989), 
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she says, "are taught to think of their lives as morally neutral, normative, and 
average, and also ideal, so that when we work to benefit others, this is seen 
as work which will allow 'them' to be more like 'us.'"66 In this sense, race 
for Whites becomes something that other people have. Additionally, 
children of all races are taught in schools and elsewhere that race is 
tantamount to the physical-usually skin color-and that racism and race 
discrimination consist of consciously not liking someone or consciously 
mistreating someone because of their skin color. 67 In fact, research by 
Professor Ann Morning of New York University's Sociology Department 
illustrates that Whites still describe race in merely physical terms and 
generally ignore the performative aspect of race. 68 Drawing on in-depth 
interviews with more than fifty white American (meaning United States 
citizen) college students, Professor Morning reveals that Whites frequently 
define race as based in biology and genes, often conflate race with ethnicity, 
and describe race as "skin color plus culture. "69 Of the seventeen percent of 
students-mostly anthropology students from one Ivy League school-who 
defined race as a social construction, when they were asked more in-depth 
questions, they too reverted to physical explanations about genes and 
biology. 70 In essence, even when people have formally learned about race as 
a social construct, they often do not fully internalize that understanding, and 
instead rely on more commonly-held and simplistic definitions of race as a 
biological reality. 
Like Professors Chacon and Rosenbury, I would prefer if courts and 
everyday citizens had more complicated understandings of race, but I am 
doubtful that such an achievement will occur without an intermediate step. 
In According to Our Hearts, I propose adding the category of"interraciality" 
because I view it as this much-needed intermediate step. Professor 
Rosenbury is correct in her belief that one reason why people may be able to 
grasp "interraciality" is because it, ironically, reinforces the idea of 
monoraciality as normative and interraciality as non-normative, which I 
available at http://www.nymbp.org/reference/WhitePrivilege.pdf. 
66. Id. 
67. Id.; see also Ann Morning, Toward a Sociology ()(Racial Conceptualization for the 2J-" 
Century, 87 Soc. FORCES 1167, 1168 (2009) (noting that "[b]iological or 'essentialist' 
understandings of race in particular are routinely linked to prejudice"). 
68. See Morning, supra note 67, at 1169 (highlighting that even though "the academic idea of 
race as socially constructed has circulated widely enough to have gained a popular, if unfaithful, 
translation as 'race is not real' ... the claim that races are genetically distinct groups is not only 
enjoying a scientific renaissance, but is also being conveyed through new products and services such 
as genetic genealogy tests that claim to identify individuals' racial ancestry, race-targeted 
pharmaceuticals, and even vitamins") (citations omitted). 
69. Id. at 1173-78. 
70. Id. at 1178, 1183-84. 
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agree is bad. However, this result may not be all bad, because the very act of 
adding a category, such as interraciality, forces people to think more broadly 
about questions of race and its categorization, which in tum may lead them 
to a better and more complex understanding of race. 
In fact, I have witnessed such processes in action during my 
presentations of draft portions of According to Our Hearts at faculty 
workshops, conferences, and lectures. At those presentations where I 
advanced my proposal regarding the addition of an "interraciality" category, 
one person would usually ask: "Well, what about those cases that do not 
quite fit into interraciality? What about those cases involving religion or 
color and so on? Wouldn't it make sense to also add an interreligion- or 
intercolor-type category?" After first making it clear that I fully believe that 
the interraciality cases I discuss in my book are "race" cases-that is, if race 
and the frameworks that incorporate "race" are understood properly-I then 
answer, "Yes, it makes perfect sense." After this response, that same person 
usually follows up with: "So, where do we draw the line? When do we stop 
adding categories?" And, that question is often precisely the right question 
to pose. In fact, I believe that this question is often what pushes people 
closer towards a deeper understanding of race. In many instances, it is this 
question about where the categories should stop that enables people to at 
least begin to conceive of race and other identity categories with more 
complexity. Once an audience member questions whether the boundaries of 
race are purely physical, she then begins to understand race as both a 
structure and a process, and also begins to see how interraciality already fits 
within the traditional, statutory identity category of race. From there, the 
audience member usually moves even further forward and also starts to 
break the mold around and evolve her own understandings of identity. And, 
as Professor Chacon predicts in her essay, such responses are exactly my 
hope: "that an expansion of antidiscrimination law will prompt the further 
evolution of social norms." 71 
At the end of the day, with respect to my proposal for an additional 
"interraciality" category, Professors Chacon and Rosenbury and I find 
ourselves in a situation where we disagree about paths to take, rather than 
about what is substantively preferable. For me, the likelihood that the 
71. Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 730. Professor Chacon makes a compelling 
argument about the evolution of social norms that she desires in her piece loving Across Borders: 
Immigration low and the limits of Loving. Jennifer M. Chacon, loving Across Borders: 
Immigration law and the limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 378 ('These legal changes have 
created a large, undocumented underclass with limited prospects for obtaining the benefits of 
citizenship, including protection of their intimate relationships."). In so doing, she does a beautiful 
job of connecting hierarchies related to bias in the field of immigration with racial hierarchies. Id. at 
376 ('The nativism that concerned the Supreme Court in loving has long contributed to the shape of 
U.S. immigration policy. It is therefore important to understand the ways that immigration laws also 
regulate family formation in ways that perpetuate racial hierarchy."). 
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general public, legislators, lawyers, and judges will adopt or accept my 
proposed changes has factored more prominently in my recent scholarship. 72 
Much like Professor Chacon's purported curmudgeonly reaction to the 
Rhinelanders' "love" story, 73 I am pessimistic about the type of change that 
is actually likely to occur within our political and legal system-a system 
that is generally resistant to change, and even when open to change, tends to 
be open only to incremental change. 74 At the end of According to Our 
Hearts, I indulge my pessimism with my ultimate proposal of adding the 
category of"interraciality." 
In the end, Professors Chacon and Rosenbury and I desire to get to the 
same end place; 75 I am just more willing to allow for an intermediate step on 
the way to that goal. In fact, it is fair to say that I worry that waiting for 
people to actually gain a full understanding of race and racism may mean 
that we never reach our end goal at all. On the other hand, Professors 
Chacon and Rosenbury worry that if we put tiny steps like my addition of 
"interraciality" in the middle of the path, we just might get stuck on those 
steps-a view that also makes complete sense given the history of 
antidiscrimination law. 
That said, to some extent, reading some of the language that Professors 
Chacon and Rosen bury use in their own essay responses ( and that I used or 
72. See, e.g., Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece, supra note 41, at 104 (making a 
strategic, litigation-based argument that rested on biology and was not in line with the framework I 
viewed as best for understanding such claims, because it adopted the rationale used by various courts 
and exposed how they were misapplying their own reasoning). In Another Hair Piece, I assert: 
Id. 
[M]y claim here is not that race is purely biological or that biological arguments are 
the only way-or even the best way-to grant black women protection from 
discriminatory grooming codes under Title VII. Instead, my argument here is much 
narrower and decidedly strategic. My claim is that, but for the courts' incorrect 
assumptions about black women's hair, black women would already be protected from 
employers' prohibitions of braided, locked, and twisted hairstyles, just as black men 
(as well as black women) are protected from certain employer restrictions on Afro 
hairstyles. 
73. Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 726. 
74. I suspect that Professors Chacon and Rosenbury share my pessimism in this regard. 
75. I acknowledge that Professor Rosenbury's definition of race may not expand as widely as 
my own. In her essay, she asserts that I analyze "how some courts have adopted narrow 
interpretations of employment discrimination laws, failing to provide redress for employees facing 
harassment or adverse employment actions because of their interracial relationships." Rosenbury, 
Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 778 (emphasis added). However, in my harassment 
example, I explicitly contest "race" as being too narrow, making the case for why what I call a "non-
white, white" person like Heather Dalmage should have standing to bring a harassment claim based 
on comments and actions taken against Blacks, not Whites. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 
256--64. Contrary to Professor Rosenbury's assertion that I "separat[e] race from relationship," I 
view them as intrinsically linked, highlighting how relationship shapes and forms racial identity or 
race. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 790. 
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use, too) has made me begin to wonder whether a new term like 
"interraciality" may not be a matter of choice, but instead a matter of 
necessity. At several points in their essays, Professors Chacon and 
Rosenbury address discrimination based on a couple's "interraciality," but 
not once do they cast it as "discrimination because of race"; instead, they use 
the phrases "discrimination because of interracial relationships" or 
"discrimination on the basis of their interracial relationships," even in cases 
where they are referring to sections in which I am highlighting how being 
part of an interracial collective alters the individual racial identities of 
persons in such families. 76 In such situations, I am explicitly discussing 
factual scenarios and examples in a way that pushes for greater recognition 
that these claims are "because of race" cases, even as the "race" in those 
situations does not fit within our usual fixed categories of race. For example, 
I write: 
What about those cases where the harassing conduct is solely 
focused on the racial group of the plaintiffs spouse, not at all on 
their relationship, and where any understanding of the plaintiff's 
harassment claim would have to be predicated upon an acceptance 
of an actual shift in racial identity for him, for example, a shift in 
the plaintiff's identity from white to nonwhite, much like Dalmage 
has explained about her own racial identity? Shouldn't these 
discrimination claims also be viable? Wouldn't they also advance 
the purposes of Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws, 
especially in situations where there was no employee of the 
targeted race in the workplace to bring the claim? Recognizing 
such claims would not only allow the "nonwhite, white" person to 
have the harm to them acknowledged by law, it also would protect 
those whites who do not want to be unwilling participants in such 
prejudiced environments. 77 
On the one hand, I completely understand that Professors Chacon and 
Rosenbury likely chose such phrasing to avoid confusion for readers who 
may not fully understand how part of what I describe as "interraciality" is 
"race discrimination." (After all, I made similar choices). On the other hand, 
such a choice, particularly when viewed alongside the two scholars' 
arguments against interraciality, supports my point about the difficulties that 
many experience in understanding "race" as broadly as I, and Professors 
Chacon and Rosenbury, would like for courts to do, suggesting that a shift in 
76. See, e.g., Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 732 (using the phrase "on the 
basis of their interracial relationships" where "because of race" would have been a better fit); 
Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 778 (using the phrase "because of their 
interracial relationships" where "because of race" would have been a better fit). 
77. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 260 ( emphasis added). 
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language may not just be preferred, but required. 
Finally, Professor Chacon astutely points out one major step or hurdle 
that my approach would have to overcome in today's climate: our 
Congress. 78 Worrying about the damage that could occur if a hostile 
Congress revisits an antidiscrimination statute such as Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, she notes her preference to leave antidiscrimination 
statutes as they are. 79 This point is a significant factor to consider. 
Ultimately, who knows which one of us is right on the question of adding 
"interraciality" as a covered class, or if any one of us is right at all? 
III. IMAGINING NEW VIEWS 
In their essays, Professors Kerry Abrams, Jacquelyn Bridgeman, and 
Robin Lenhardt take the virtues they see in According to Our Hearts and 
enhance them, adding their insights on the implicit contributions that the 
book makes to our understanding of law and social norms. In so doing, they 
highlight the points that they found most moving and compelling in 
According to Our Hearts, and they offer their insights on other unstated 
lessons from the book. Although it may sound peculiar for me to say that I 
learned much about my own book, including its substance, from outside 
readers, that sentiment carries here. The readers' lessons rejuvenated my 
senses, enlivening my views of According to Our Hearts and its breadth and 
reach. 
In fact, I often experienced this type of revitalization as I was 
interviewing, reading, and listening to responses from the individuals in the 
twenty-one subject-couples-all anonymous-who added so much soul and 
meaning to According to Our Hearts. These amazing couples often gave me 
a unique lens through which to understand the constraints of race and racism 
on multiracial families, and the individuals within them. I particularly 
remember how the comments of one survey participant named Fiona, 80 a 
fifty-plus year-old black woman who is married to a white man, Peter, 
dramatically fortified my understanding of not only the harmful effects of 
Jim Crow segregation, but also the inherently violent and cruel nature of 
such state-sponsored segregation. Speaking about the many social cues that 
my subject-couples had received in their lives against interracial intimacy, I 
78. Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 734 ("A third reason to be wary of the 
proposed change is that it requires Congress to reopen discussion of the antidiscrimination 
provisions if they want to add a category. Given political retrenchment on equality issues in recent 
years, it seems just as likely that the result would be a congressional narrowing of antidiscrimination 
law once the topic was opened for discussion. Perhaps it is best in this political climate to leave these 
particular laws alone."). 
79. Id. 
80. This name is a pseudonym. 
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assert the following in According to Our Hearts: 
For instance, Fiona described the first time that she learned and 
understood what it meant to be black and white in our society and, 
along with that, the clear lines of separation between blackness and 
whiteness. She declared: "We were visiting my grandmother in 
Jackson, Mississippi. I was about three or four years old. I went to 
drink from a White water fountain that looked like the ones I drank 
from in Chicago. My mother snatched me and exclaimed, 'That's 
the White water fountain! Are you trying to get us killed?"'81 
Fiona's comment about her near life-threatening misstep as a toddler 
has remained with me since I first learned about it, not just because it is a 
harrowing and frightening account of the constant dangers that Blacks lived 
under during the Jim Crow era, but also because of what it communicates 
about the damage that black parents were forced to inflict upon their 
children at such an early age. Fiona's comment made me think of my own 
three children, and in particular, my now four-year-old (and then three-year-
old) child. As any parent of young children understands, three-year-olds and 
four-year-olds have their own minds. My mother-in-law often says, "You 
cannot reason with a four-year-old." As a parent, I began to think about what 
things I would have been forced to implicitly convey to my child to avoid 
even the risk of near-death experiences like the three- or four-year-old Fiona 
and her family in Mississippi. I thought about what I would have been 
forced to explain to my four-year-old, and how I would have had to couch 
my explanations in terms of clear-cut lines of race that could send only one 
meaning to him. I thought about how many "why" questions would have 
followed each of my sentences during my explanations and about how the 
only message that my child could and would absorb from my lessons on Jim 
Crow survival and my explanations about how the world racially operated 
would have been implicit ones about his alleged inferiority, his allegedly 
being less-than, despite any claims I made to the contrary about his own 
worth to counteract these inherently soul-damaging lessons of survival. 
Fiona's account of her childhood memory allowed me to see a Jim 
Crow environment through my Jens as a parent, rather than as an imagined 
target. Looking through this parental lens enabled me to more fully 
appreciate the inherently violent nature of state-mandated segregation. It was 
only through this lens that I began to truly see the wickedness and the 
horrific violence of Jim Crow. My new view of Jim Crow's horrors that I 
had uncovered involved seeing how white segregationists manipulated the 
love of black parents to insure that black children absorbed messages of 
inferiority, not just explicitly through "Coloreds Only" signs and physical 
violence, but also implicitly through a parent or loved one's directions and 
81. 0NWUACHJ-WILLIG, supra note I, at 246. 
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lessons to a child, beginning essentially from day one. The cruelty came not 
just through the lynchings, beatings, and killings that forced parents to pass 
on the survival skill of following Jim Crow rules to their children from the 
very day that they could walk and possibly break those rules; it also came 
through the fact that parents, in simply providing direction and guidance to 
their children on how to survive (like all parents must do), were forced to 
convey an implicit meaning of inferiority to their own children. It was only 
then that I could fully appreciate the social cues that Fiona had to overcome 
to love Peter82 and, more so, fully acknowledge the value of 
all the cues that my survey participants had received about strict 
boundaries against interracial intimacy during their lives, (and of 
how, they, when] ... faced with the same tug-of-war decision 
about love and race that Leonard [Rhinelander had] encountered, .. 
. still resisted the forces against them to follow their hearts in 
deciding to whom they would commit themselves. 83 
Similarly, the essays of Professors Abrams, Bridgeman, and Lenhardt 
each opened my eyes in varying ways and on varying topics. I will pinpoint 
segments of the essays by these three scholars that, like Fiona's words, 
widened and brightened my view on an issue, thereby giving me a clearer 
perspective on the reach of my own work. I will start with Professor 
Abrams's essay, and then move to Professor Bridgeman's piece before 
ending with Professor Lenhardt's paper. 
Professor Abrams's analysis of the meanings of modem marriage, as 
seen and interpreted through the many changes in annulment law over time, 
expanded my view of how both Leonard and Alice may have been 
expressing their own individual identities through their decisions to marry 
each other. In her essay, Professor Abrams examines what annulment means 
"culturally-and the goals of the people who seek it ... to understand how 
marriage forges and alters people's identities."84 Abrams notes that courts 
have actually begun to "expand the 'essentials' doctrine in ways that stretch 
it beyond recognition" by offering annulments based on arguments related to 
"individuals' core personal identities, such as the desire to avoid being a 
parent, sexual orientation, or national citizenship."85 Professor Abrams 
82. This name is a pseudonym. 
83. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 248. 
84. Kerry Abrams, The End of"Annulment, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 681, 683 (2013) 
[hereinafter Abrams, The End a/Annulment]. 
85. Id. at 690; see also Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. I (2012) (arguing 
that the reason for the proliferation of marriage fraud doctrines in more recent centuries are (I) an 
increased availability of easy divorce, (2) the legalization and decreased social stigma of nonmarital 
sex and childbearing, and (3) the increased use of marriage as an eligibility category for state and 
federal benefits). 
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posits that "[c]ourts' willingness to expand annulment law in this direction 
may indicate a new understanding of the purpose of marriage."86 
Specifically, she argues that these expansions in annulment are indicative of 
the way in which "marriage has taken on a new meaning, an identity-
producing one, in which the recognition of a fraudulent marriage can harm 
someone's personal integrity."87 Marriage, she says, "can be more identity-
producing" because marriage, after all, is self-expression, and "in some 
ways[,] the ultimate self-expression."88 Professor Abrams ends with 
insightful examples of how the "newer" accepted bases for annulment are 
tied more closely to contemporary understandings of identity. 89 She astutely 
asserts: 
If marriage is a project of personal self-fulfillment and expression, 
then finding out that the person you married was never actually 
physically attracted to you (because of sexual orientation) or used 
to be a different gender could be remarkably destabilizing to one's 
sense of self. If marriage is a joint project, in which goals and 
desires specific to the couple can be brought to fruition, it is not 
surprising that judges would find lying about the desire to 
procreate to be just as important as lies about one's ability or 
willingness to do so. And if marriage is central to a person's core 
identity, finding out that your spouse married you only to obtain a 
different identity-like U.S. citizenship-might feel like the 
ultimate betrayal. 
. . . This kind of fraud may be one of the purest examples of 
using a spouse for ulterior motives, a kind of identity theft through 
marriage. If marriage is anything today, it is a commitment to a 
joint project-whatever that project may be. For someone seeking 
an annulment today, the "end" or goal of annulment may be to 
reclaim his or her pre-marital identity. 90 
As Professor Abrams notes, the "identity-producing aspect of marriage 
is a theme that threads its way through According to Our Hearts." 91 
However, her analysis in The End of Annulment revealed to me that my view 
86. Abrams, The End of Annulment, supra note 84, at 690-91. 
87. Id. at 696; see also Keny Abrams, Citizen Spouse, 100 CALIF. L. REV. I (2012) (showing 
how contemporary marriage law provides a gender-neutral form of marriage as citizenship in which 
married people are expected to have their identities radically changed through marriage). 
88. Abrams, The End of Annulment, supra note 84, at 697. 
89. Id. at 702-03. 
90. Id. at 701-02. 
91. Id. at 698. 
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of that aspect of marriage with regard to Leonard Rhinelander may have 
been too one-sided. 92 For example, in According to Our Hearts, I express 
surprise at survey participants' harsh criticisms of Leonard; for most of my 
survey participants, the historical context under which the Rhinelander trial 
occurred did not matter in their judgments of Leonard, and they generally 
referred to him in a poor light, calling him a "weak" man, a "jerk," a 
"coward," and a "gutless" person. 93 As I read Professor Abrams's paper, I 
realized that my surprise at participants' reactions to Leonard occurred only 
because I had focused so much on the Rhinelanders' failed love story, 
looking at Alice and Leonard primarily as victims in a society that tore them 
apart because of racism and classism instead of considering how their own 
actions, specifically Leonard's, also may have been an expression of racial 
identity (much like I did for so many other persons whom I discussed in the 
book). 94 Professor Abrams's analysis of what the shifts in annulment signal 
about marriage and its role in one's personal expression of identity brought 
me much closer to viewing Leonard and Alice through the lens of Professor 
Chacon, who "read the story of the Rhinelanders as an ill-fated liaison 
between a social climber and a thoughtless, callow, and over-privileged 
young white man who could not see the potentially destructive effect of 
acting on his desires until it was too late."95 In explaining her views on 
Leonard and Alice, Professor Chacon asserts: 
Even if I assume that Leonard Rhinelander was naive about either 
Alice's race (a finding which the jury rejected in Rhinelander) or 
of the consequences to both of them if her status as a non-white 
woman became public, it is difficult for me to understand his 
actions as anything other than an exercise of a remarkable degree 
of privilege. I wonder what sort of bubble he was living in to think 
that he could marry any person he chose without subjecting his 
marriage and his partner to tremendous scrutiny and possible social 
disapproval. And if he was not prepared to bear the obvious 
92. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 241 ("Perhaps naively, when I first posed questions 
about Alice and Leonard to my survey participants, I halfway expected that a few of them would 
speak about Leonard's failure to stand up to his father within the context of the time period involved, 
but only two of them ever did. When I thought more deeply about the couples themselves, I realized 
that their largely unsympathetic responses to Leonard, even when taking the time period into ac-
count, were not surprising in light of their own experiences. For one thing, very few of the 
participants in my survey had encountered much opposition from their families to their marriage or 
commitment based on race. In fact, unlike Leonard during the 1920s, most of them came from 
families that were supportive and happy that they had finally found true love in their lives."). 
93. Id. at 240. 
94. See generally id. at 1-117 (involving Part I of the book, which describes the failed love 
story of the Rhinelanders); id. at 233-41 (involving Chapter Eight, which includes the subject 
couples' reactions to Leonard). 
95. Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 726. 
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costs-namely, being disinherited and socially ostracized by his 
family and its social circle-then it is not at all clear to me why he 
married Alice in the first place. 96 
In The End of Annulment, Professor Abrams clarifies exactly how Professor 
Chac6n's view is not one that should make her feel "curmudgeonly" at all. 
In wondering how Alice and Leonard Rhinelander may have each been 
expressing their individual identities through marriage, Professor Abrams 
writes: 
[F]or the Rhinelander couple, marriage may also have been a self-
expression of identity. Leonard may have been attempting to forge 
a new identity for himself, independent of a wealthy family. Alice 
may have been, consciously or not, attempting to stake her claim as 
a "white" person in a world where with whiteness came the 
possibility of wealth and respect. 97 
When I begin to think of Alice and Leonard's actions and statements more 
as individual expressions of their identity, rather than simple reactions to 
thwarted love, I begin to see them, particularly Leonard, more like Professor 
Chacon does, and less as pure victims of racism. After all, if Leonard viewed 
his marriage to Alice as an explicit, personal statement about racial 
hierarchies and his personal rejection of them, then I agree that his decision 
to not stand beside his wife is quite thoughtless, callow, and weak because of 
his refusal to stand by this powerful statement and his willingness to give in 
to societal and familial pressures about race. 
In tum, this view of Leonard makes me think of how, in our current 
society where monoracial coupling is still the expectation, others may view 
the act of marriage for any person in an interracial marriage as an affirmative 
rejection of racial hierarchies, even if the individuals in the interracial couple 
see their marriage as expressing love only, not any "political" statements. In 
this sense, multiracial couples-here, too--have part of their voice taken 
away from them, much like Alice, who never testified at trial, did. 
Professor Bridgeman's essay builds upon the insights that I gained from 
Professor Abrams' s The End of Annulment by examining how far we have to 
go before we reach a place of equal value, and by explaining how 
interraciality can help to disrupt the norms that are critical to reaching that 
point of equal value. Professor Bridgeman highlights some of the ways in 
which attitudes on interracial marriage can inform our understanding of how 
close society is to equality, asserting that "if 37% of individuals would not 
be fine with a family member marrying a person of a different race, it 
suggests that despite significant progress, we have a ways to go before we 
96. Id. 
97. Abrams, The End of Annulment, supra note 84, at 698. 
A Room with Many Views 821 
reach a place of equal value."98 She further contends that "disrupting our 
current racial norms is a key component of moving towards the goal of equal 
value."99 
One important means for disrupting these norms, Professor Bridgeman 
contends, is through the concept of interraciality and the way in which it can 
shift an individual's racial identity. Like many of the authors in this 
colloquium did in their own essays, Professor Bridgeman specifically points 
to my discussion of Professor Heather Dalmage's comments concerning how 
her racial identity as a white person shifted after she married a black man 
and began to experience different forms of discrimination that she had not 
previously encountered. Professor Bridgeman wisely stresses that "it 1s 
important not to confuse [interraciality] with integration." 100 She explains: 
While integration is essential to foster interraciality, the concepts 
the two words embody, at least as they are defined here, are not 
interchangeable. As this Article conceives of each, integration 
involves merely the mixing, on some level, of people of different 
races. In contrast, interraciality involves the relationship of two or 
more individuals of different races such that being part of the 
interracial collective alters the sense of identity of all of those who 
form part of the collective . 
. . . For example, prior to marrying my mother, my white step-
father spent significant time in integrated settings and had friends 
and acquaintances who were not white. However, it was not until 
he married my mother and became involved in raising two black 
children that he began to look closely at his own identity. It was 
only then that he started questioning what it meant to be white and 
to have a race. It was only then that his views on racial norms 
began to significantly shift. 101 
What was most striking and compelling about Professor Bridgeman's 
essay, however, was her perspective on the different ways and speeds at 
which interraciality may alter the identities of individuals within the same 
family, and in her case, a monoracial child whose divorced mother remarried 
a white man during her childhood, who then assisted in raising her within a 
multiracial home. Because the experiences of children in multiracial families 
was a topic that I had to leave for another book project due to limited space, 
98. Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, On Shifiing Hearts and Minds: lnterraciality, Equal Value, and 
Equality, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 705, 714 (2013). 
99. Id. at 710 ( citation omitted). 
100. ld.at717. 
IO I. Id. at 717, 720 ( citations omitted). 
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Professor Bridgeman's experiences as a child particularly intrigued me. It 
was interesting to see how strong and how deep the message of 
monoraciality had been ingrained into her understanding of herself, a woman 
with "mixed blood in [her] heritage on both sides of [her] family" and who 
grew up in a multiracial family. 102 She explicated: 
Until recently, if asked, I would not have hesitated to say I am 
African American and that I was raised African American, despite 
the fact that the step-father who helped raise me nearly all of my 
life, who has served as my psychological father, and who is the 
person I think of first as my father, is white. I would have said this 
despite the fact that I grew up with two white step-sisters, a white 
step-mother, and a white grandmother who was the only 
grandmother I have ever known, not to mention many aunts, 
uncles, and cousins who are also white. 103 
But again, it was rather moving to see, as Professor Bridgeman noted, how 
those once deeply entrenched norms became destabilized as she formed her 
own multiracial family. Professor Bridgeman stated: 
Being part of a close, interracial collective helps make such norms 
visible. Interraciality can engender the questioning of such norms 
in ways that are destabilizing, and in ways that cause the 
individuals in the collective to recognize, to conceive of, and to 
articulate identities that go beyond and run counter to those norms. 
I saw this happen with my step-father as he was raising my brother 
and me, and I now recognize it in myself, as I am in the midst of 
raising my own multiracial children. Having to raise my own 
children has caused me to reflect upon and question my own 
identity. This reflection and questioning has caused my identity to 
shift and has caused me to see differently aspects of my identity 
that I had previously taken for granted. 104 
Finally, Professor Lenhardt's response to According to Our Hearts 
ignites an examination of "the structural elements that limit interracial 
intimacy, families, and parenting in the United States,"105 and pushes for 
further examinations of these structures. Professor Lenhardt particularly 
focuses on my explication of the "placelessness" of multiracial families in 
the country and my proposal for the addition of an "interraciality" category 
102. ld.at716. 
103. Id. 
I 04. Bridgeman, supra note 98, at 721. 
I 05. Robin Lenhardt, According to Our Hearts and location: Toward a Structuralist Approach 
to the Study of Interracial Families, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 741, 743 (2013). 
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in anti-discrimination statutes. She declares: 
While Onwuachi-Willig admittedly does not explicitly champion a 
structure-based inquiry, this Article endeavors to show that this 
discussion of placelessness and other aspects of her book lend 
themselves nicely to a discussion of structural racism and its 
impact on interracial families. Structuralism-a focus on "the 
cumulative effect of institutional structures and systems on 
outcomes for institutions, groups, and individuals"-has a great 
deal to offer the study of the interracial family. This Article thus 
suggests a point of intervention for scholars interested in bringing 
structuralist insights into the study of race and family. 106 
823 
Professor Lenhardt examines the Rhinelander tale as one of "race and 
space," highlighting the impacts of such structures on individual race 
identity as well as marriage. She then "asks what a more intentional and 
sustained focus on structural racial discrimination and its impact on 
interracial couples and families would look like." 107 In analyzing the jury's 
verdict in Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, she deftly looks beyond Alice's body 
and family to inquire whether "the jurors empanelled in the Rhinelander 
trial, which was held in Westchester County, were aware of [the racial] 
dynamics [of Westchester County, New York, including the town in which 
Alice lived]," whether the jurors "easily could have been influenced, even 
before seeing Alice's bare breasts, by the racial information that the racial 
boundaries of 1920s Westchester County communicated," or even whether 
they marked Alice as black as a result of her work as a maid. 108 
Professor Lenhardt calls for scholars to address "interracial intimacy 
from an explicitly structural perspective .... " 109 In describing what this 
research agenda would look like, Professor Lenhardt contends that it, among 
other things, "must[] tak[e] a page from [According to Our Hearts'] 
playbook[ and] first seek answers to current challenges by better 
understanding the past." 110 In so doing, Professor Lenhardt offers a few 
examples of how scholars may undertake this project, including, but not 
limited to, examining the relationship between anti-miscegenation laws and 
school segregation; considering how space and race shape thoughts about 
interracial families and parenting, such as the misidentification of black 
mothers as the nannies of their multiracial children that I analyzed in 
Chapter Six; and exploring "more closely other types of cross-racial 
I 06. Id. at 744-45 ( citations omitted). 
107. Id. at 747. 
108. Id. at 759. 
109. Id. at 763. 
110. Id. 
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relationships and the legal structures that inhibit or promote them," 111 such 
as I began to do in Chapter Eight of According to Our Hearts. 112 
It is difficult to add much to Professor Lenhardt's astute and inspiring 
observations in her essay. She does an excellent job of laying out where we 
as scholars may go from here in looking at interracial intimacies and, more 
so, in proposing and adopting a structuralist approach for doing so. At a 
minimum, Professor Lenhardt makes it clear to all of us that there is still 
much work to be done, that there is still much to be learned, and that there is 
still much to be discussed. She begins to widen the view and proffers many 
new paths for us to explore. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it has been my honor to have the opportunity to learn 
from Professors Kerry Abrams, Jacquelyn Bridgeman, Jennifer Chacon, 
Robin Lenhardt, Laura Rosenbury, and Melissa Murray in this colloquium 
on law and the multiracial family. The essays in this issue have sharpened 
my understanding of the Rhinelanders, race, law, privilege, and family often 
in ways that I had not anticipated. For those readers who are perusing and/or 
studying According to Our Hearts: Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Law 
of the Multiracial Family (hopefully, tons of you), I invite you to join us in 
this room of essays, this room with many views of the book, its messages, its 
significance, and our hearts. 
111. Lenhardt, supra note 105, at 766. 
112. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 233-67. 
